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Abstract
We study the social efficiency of several well-known mechanisms for the allocation of a set of available (advertising)
positions to a set of competing budget-constrained users (advertisers). Specifically, we focus on the Generalized
Second Price auction (GSP), the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism (VCG) and the Expressive Generalized First
Price auction (EGFP). Using liquid welfare as our efficiency benchmark, we prove a tight bound of 2 on the liquid
price of anarchy and stability of these mechanisms for pure Nash equilibria.
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1. Introduction
Position mechanisms have been extensively used for the allocation of advertising positions (with different click-
through rates) when keywords are queried in search engines. Such mechanisms auction off the available positions to
the interested advertisers, who in turn compete with each other by submitting bids, expressing how much they value
the available advertising positions (per user click).
There have been numerous papers analyzing the properties of position mechanisms. Edelman et al. [11] (see
also [18]) studied the generalized first price auction (GFP) as well as the generalized second price auction (GSP).
According to these mechanisms, the advertisers are sorted in terms of the scalar bids that they submit, and each of
them is pays her own bid or the next highest bid, respectively. These definitions allow the advertisers to strategize
over their bids and engage as players into a strategic game. Edelman et al. [11] proved that the games induced by
GFP are not guaranteed to have pure Nash equilibria, while the games induced by GSP always have socially efficient
pure Nash equilibria with respect to the social welfare benchmark (the total value of the players for the positions they
are given); consequently, the price of stability [1] of GSP is equal to 1. Caragiannis et al. [3] (see also [17]) focused
on worst-case equilibria and proved several bounds on the price of anarchy [13] of GSP with respect to a variety of
equilibrium concepts, ranging from pure Nash and coarse-correlated equilibria in the full information setting to Bayes-
Nash equilibria in the incomplete information setting. Du¨tting et al. [10] proved bounds on the revenue and exploited
more expressive input formats as a remedy for the non-existence of pure Nash equilibria in games induced by GFP.
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They designed the expressive generalized first price auction (EGFP) according to which each player submits a bid per
position, the positions are auctioned off sequentially, and each player pays her bid for the position she is given.
All of the aforementioned papers studied the no-budget setting, where the players are assumed to be able to afford
any payments, no matter how large these can get. However, in reality, the players have hard budget constraints
that upper-bound the payments that they can afford. Following a series of recent papers that focus on such budget-
constrained settings, we also study the social efficiency of position mechanisms by bounding the (pure) price of
anarchy and stability in terms of the liquid welfare benchmark that takes budgets into account. Liquid welfare was first
introduced by Dobzinski and Paes Leme [9] who focused on the design of truthful mechanisms for the allocation of
multiple units of a single divisible item (see also [14, 15] for extensions of this setting). One of the very first results of
Dobzinski and Paes Leme [9] is the observation that the celebrated VCG mechanism [19, 7, 12] is no longer truthful,
which is the case for VCG in our setting as well.
The liquid price of anarchy has been considered in a few related papers so far. Syrgkanis and Tardos [17] con-
sidered the liquid welfare benchmark under the term effective welfare and bounded the ratio between the optimal
liquid welfare and the worst-case social welfare at equilibrium, in various strategic auction settings, including position
mechanisms. Caragiannis and Voudouris [4] and Christodoulou et al. [6] were the first to provide constant bounds
on the liquid price of anarchy (ratio of optimal liquid welfare over worst-case liquid welfare at equilibrium) of the
proportional mechanism for the allocation of divisible resources. These results are based on the now-standard unilat-
eral deviations technique (see also [16]) and can be extended to more general equilibrium concepts, given a specific
definition of the liquid welfare for randomized allocations. Our upper bounds follow this technique as well, but it
seems non-trivial to extend them to more general equilibrium concepts due to the particular form of the deviating bids
used. For pure equilibria in particular, by exploiting the structure of worst-case equilibria, Caragiannis and Voudouris
[5] were able to characterize the liquid price of anarchy of all mechanisms for the allocation of a single divisible
resource, leading to tight bounds. Finally, Azar et al. [2] refined the definition of the liquid welfare for randomized
allocations and proved constant liquid price of anarchy bounds over general equilibrium concepts for simultaneous
first price auctions.
In Section 2, we formally describe the setting considered in this paper and the mechanisms that we are interested
in. Then, in Section 3 we prove our main result: the liquid price of anarchy and stability of GSP, VCG and EGFP is
exactly 2. Consequently, in contrast to the no-budget setting, when we consider players with budget constraints and the
liquid welfare benchmark, these mechanisms do not have socially efficient equilibria. Such a phenomenon was first
observed by Caragiannis and Voudouris [5] for all single divisible resource allocation mechanisms, and it might be the
case that this holds for any position mechanism as well. We conclude with a short discussion of possible extensions of
our work in Section 4.
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2. Preliminaries
There are n available positions such that position j has associated click-through-rate (CTR) αj ∈ R>0 such that
αj ≥ αj+1 for j ∈ [n − 1]; let α = (αj)j∈[n] be the vector containing the CTRs of all positions. Furthermore,
there are n players that compete over these positions. Player i has a valuation vi and a total private budget ci; let
v = (vi)i∈[n] and c = (ci)i∈[n] be the vectors containing the valuations and budgets of all players. The valuation vi
indicates the value that player i has per click and, therefore, if player i is assigned to some position j, then her total
value is αjvi. The budget ci can be thought of as an upper bound to the payment that the player can afford in order to
buy some position.
We consider several greedy mechanisms for the allocation of positions to players, which generally work as follows.
Let M be a greedy mechanism. Each player i submits a bid bi that can either be a real non-negative scalar or a vector
of scalars per position, depending on the input format thatM requires; let b be the vector (or matrix) of bids submitted
by all players. Then, the players are sorted in non-increasing order in terms of their bids and the induced ranking σ(b)
indicates the position σi(b) that is assigned to each player i; therefore, we call σ(b) an assignment that is induced by
b. Also, let pij(b) denote the player that is assigned to position j such that piσi(b)(b) = i. The mechanism charges
player i an amount of money pi(b,M) that depends on b, and may or may not depend on ασi(b). Given a bid vector
b, each player i has utility ui(b,M) = ασi(b)vi− pi(b,M) if pi(b,M) ≤ ci, and −∞ otherwise. We focus on three
important greedy allocation mechanisms that function as follows.
Generalized Second Price (GSP). Each player i submits a scalar bi ∈ R≥0. The players are sorted in non-
increasing order in terms of these bids and are assigned to the corresponding positions. Each player i is charged
the next highest bid per click, that is, the bid of player piσi(b)+1(b) who is assigned to the next position σi(b) + 1.
Hence, the payment of player i is pi(b,GSP) = ασi(b)bpiσi(b)+1(b), and her utility can be written as ui(b,GSP) =
ασi(b)
(
vi − bpiσi(b)+1(b)
)
. 1
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG). Again, each player i submits a scalar bi ∈ R≥0, and the players are sorted in non-
increasing order in terms of their bids. Each player i is charged the difference between the social welfare (based on
the bids) of the players ranked below i if i did not participate and their actual social welfare when i participates. In
other words, the payment of player i is pi(b,VCG) =
∑n
j=σi(b)+1
bpi(j)(αj−1−αj), and her utility can be written as
ui(b,VCG) = ασi(b)
(
vi − 1ασi(b)
∑n
j=σi(b)+1
bpi(j)(αj−1 − αj)
)
.
Expressive Generalized First Price (EGFP). Each player i submits a vector bi ∈ Rn≥0 containing a bid per position.
The positions are assigned to the players sequentially so that the next available position gets assigned to the player
with the maximum bid for it, among the players that have not yet been allocated a position. In other words, let Sj
1Interestingly, Dı´az et al. [8] proved that GSP may not have any equilibria when the number of players exceeds the number of available positions
and proposed alternative mechanisms; we here consider the same number of players and positions.
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be the set of players that are competing for positions ` ≥ j; initially, S1 contains all players. Then, pij(b,EGFP) =
argmaxi∈Sj bi,j . Each player i is charged (in total) her bid for the position that she is allocated, i.e., pi(b,EGFP) =
bi,σi(b), and her utility is ui(b,EGFP) = ασi(b)vi − bi,σi(b).
The game. LetM ∈ {GSP,VCG,EGFP} be any of the aforementioned position mechanisms. MechanismM induces
a strategic position game G(M) among the players who act as utility maximizers; this is true even for VCG as we will
see in the next section. A bid vector (or matrix) b is called a pure Nash equilibrium (or, simply, equilibrium) for G(M)
if all players simultaneously maximize their utilities and have no incentive to deviate to any different bid in order to
increase their personal utility, i.e., ui(b,M) ≥ ui((y,b−i),M), for all players i and bids y 6= bi. Here, the notation
(y,b−i) is used to denote the vector (or matrix) that is obtained by b when player i bids y (and all other players bid
according to b). Let eq(G(M)) be the set of all equilibria of the position game G(M).
Liquid welfare, price of anarchy and price of stability. We measure the social efficiency of an assignment σ(b) by the
liquid welfare benchmark, which is defined as the total value of the players, with the value of each player capped by
her budget, i.e.,
LW(σ(b)) =
∑
i
min{ασi(b)vi, ci}.
The liquid price of anarchy (liquid price of stability) of a position game G(M) that is induced by a position mechanism
M is defined as the ratio between the optimal liquid welfare achieved by any assignment to the minimum (maximum)
liquid welfare achieved at any equilibrium assignment. In other words, the liquid price of anarchy and the liquid price
of stability of G(M) are, respectively, equal to
LPoA(G(M)) = maxy LW(σ(y))
minb∈eq(G(M)) LW(σ(b))
.
and
LPoS(G(M)) = maxy LW(σ(y))
maxb∈eq(G(M)) LW(σ(b))
.
Then, the liquid price of anarchy and stability of a mechanismM are respectively defined as the worst-case liquid price
of anarchy and stability among all position games that are induced by M , i.e., LPoA(M) = supG(M) LPoA(G(M))
and LPoS(M) = supG(M) LPoS(G(M)) .
The no-over assumption: no-overbidding and no-overbudgeting. For the GSP and VCG mechanisms, in order to have
meaningful bounds on the liquid price of anarchy, we assume that ασi(b)bi ≤ min{ασi(b)vi, ci} for every player i.
This is a combination of the well-known no-overbidding assumption that demands that bi ≤ vi and a no-overbudgeting
assumption that demands that alphaσi(b)bi ≤ ci. This assumption is necessary as it is easy (like in the case of the
classic price of anarchy literature that deals with the social welfare objective) to construct position games that have
arbitrarily bad liquid price of anarchy when the players overbid. For the EGFP mechanism such an assumption is of
course not necessary due to the definition of the payment function.
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3. Bounds on the liquid price of anarchy and stability
We begin with Theorem 1, where we show that the LPoA and LPoS of GSP, VCG and EGFP are at least 2; notice
that the example that we present in the following proof also proves that VCG is no longer truthful when the players
have budget constraints. Then, in Theorem 2 we prove that this bound of 2 on the LPoA and LPoS is tight.
Theorem 1. The liquid price of anarchy and stability of GSP, VCG (under the no-over assumption) and EGFP are at
least 2.
PROOF. Let M ∈ {GSP,VCG,EGFP}, λ > 2 and ε ∈ (0, 1/2). Consider a position game G(M) among two players
with valuations v = (λ, 1) and budgets c = (1 + ε, 1), for two positions with CTRs α = (1, 1/λ). Observe that,
for the two possible assignments (1, 2) and (2, 1), the liquid welfare is LW(1, 2) = min{λ, 1 + ε} + min{ 1λ , 1} =
(1+ε)λ+1
λ and LW(2, 1) = min{1, 1 + ε} + min{1, 1} = 2. Therefore, since λ > 2 and ε < 1/2, we have that
LW(2, 1) > LW(1, 2), and the optimal assignment is (2, 1). The ratio
LW(2, 1)
LW(1, 2)
=
2λ
(1 + ε)λ+ 1
tends to 2 as λ becomes arbitrarily large and ε becomes arbitrarily small. In order to prove the theorem, it suffices to
show that there exists an equilibrium bid vector that induces the assignment (1, 2), while there exists no equilibrium
bid vector that induces the assignment (2, 1).
GSP. First, consider the bid vector b = (1+ε, 1) which induces the assignment (1, 2). The utilities of the two players
are u1(b,GSP) = λ− 1 and u2(b,GSP) = 1λ . Player 2 has no incentive to deviate as, by the no-over assumption, she
cannot bid above her budget (which coincides with her value), while any other bid would not change the assignment.
Player 1 obviously has no incentive to deviate to any other bid b′1 ≥ b2 as the assignment as well as her payment would
not change. So, consider the deviation of player 1 to the bid b′1 = b2−γ, for some γ > 0. Then, the induced assignment
would be (2, 1) and player 1 would have utility u1((b′1, b2),GSP) = 1 < u1(b,GSP) since λ > 2. Therefore, b is an
equilibrium, and the price of anarchy bound follows.
Now, assume that there exists an equilibrium bid vector b = (b1, b2) with b1 ≤ b2 ≤ 1 so that the assignment (2, 1)
is induced, while the no-over assumption is satisfied (for player 2). The utilities of the two players at this equilibrium
are u1(b,GSP) = 1 and u2(b,GSP) = 1 − b1. Consider the deviation of player 1 to the bid b′1 = c1 = 1 + ε > b2.
Then, the utility of this player would be u1((b′1, b2),GSP) = λ − b2 ≥ λ − 1 > 1, since b2 ≤ 1 and λ > 2. Hence,
player 1 has incentive to deviate to b′1 and b cannot be an equilibrium. The price of stability bound follows.
VCG. Like in the case of GSP, consider the bid vector b = (1 + , 1) which induces the assignment (1, 2). The
payments of the players are p1(b,VCG) = 1− 1λ and p2(b,VCG) = 0, yielding utilities of u1(b,VCG) = λ− 1+ 1λ
and u2(b,VCG) = 1λ . Obviously, again player 2 has no incentive to deviate, while player 1 has no incentive to deviate
to any bid b′1 ≥ b2. So, consider the deviation of player 1 to the bid b′1 = b2 − γ, for some γ > 0. Then, the
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induced assignment would be (2, 1), the payment of player 1 would be p1((b′1, b2),VCG) = 0 and her utility would be
u1((b
′
1, b2),VCG) = 1 < λ−1+ 1λ = u1(b,VCG) since (λ−1)2 > 0, for any λ > 2. Therefore, b is an equilibrium,
and the price of anarchy bound follows.
Now, assume that there exists an equilibrium bid vector b = (b1, b2) with b1 ≤ b2 ≤ 1 so that the assignment (2, 1)
is induced, while the no-over assumption is satisfied (for player 2). The payments of the players at this equilibrium
are p1(b,VCG) = 0 and p2(b,VCG) = b1
(
1− 1λ
)
, yielding utilities of u1(b,VCG) = 1 and u2(b,VCG) =
1 − b1
(
1− 1λ
)
. Consider the deviation of player 1 to the bid b′1 = c1 = 1 + ε > b2. Then, the induced assignment
would be (1, 2), while the payment and the utility of player 1 would be p1((b′1, b2),VCG) = b2
(
1− 1λ
) ≤ 1− 1λ and
u1((b
′
1, b2),VCG) = λ− p1(b′1, b2) ≥ λ− 1+ 1λ > 1, respectively; the last inequality follows since (λ− 1)2 > 0, for
any λ > 2. Hence, since player 1 has incentive to deviate to b′1, b cannot be an equilibrium, and the price of stability
bound follows.
EGFP. To show that there exists an equilibrium bid vector b that induces the assignment (1, 2), consider the bids
b1 = (1 + δ, 0), where δ > 0 is arbitrarily small, and b2 = (1, 0) of the two players for the two available positions,
respectively. Observe that after the allocation of the first position, the second one is given without any competition to
the only remaining player. Therefore, at equilibrium, no player has any incentive to submit a bid that is greater than
zero for the second position. Player 2 has no incentive to change her bid for the first position since she simply cannot
bid any higher, while bidding any lower would not change the assignment. Player 1 has no incentive to deviate to any
other bid b′1,1 ≥ b2,1 as the allocation and her payment would not change, and δ is assumed to be arbitrarily small. So,
consider the deviating bid b′1,1 < b2,1 which would change the assignment to (2, 1) and the utility of player 1 would
be u′1(((b
′
1,1, 0),b2),EGFP) = 1 < λ − 1 = u1(b,EGFP). Therefore, b is indeed an equilibrium, and the price of
anarchy bound follows.
For the price of stability bound, assume that there exists an equilibrium bid matrix b such that b1,1 ≤ b2,1 ≤ 1 so
that the allocation (2, 1) is induced; again the two players must bid zero for the second position which is, basically,
for free. The utilities of the two players at this equilibrium are u1(b,EGFP) = 1 and u2(b) = 1− b2,1. Consider the
deviation of player 1 to the bid b′1,1 = 1+ δ > b2,1 for the first position, where δ > 0 is arbitrarily small. Then, player
1 would be allocated the first position and her utility would be u1(((b′1,1, 0),b2),EGFP) = λ− b1,1 = λ− 1− δ > 1,
since λ > 2 and δ is arbitrarily small. Hence, player 1 has no incentive to deviate to b′1 = (b
′
1,1, 0), b cannot be an
equilibrium, and the proof is complete. 
The proof of the upper bounds exploits the well-known technique (for proving welfare guarantees in games) of
deviating bids. However, it is more complicated since the selected deviating bids must be such that the payments of the
players are within their budgets. In fact, this is the main barrier in proving LPoA bounds for more general equilibrium
concepts, like Bayes-Nash equilibria in the incomplete information model, where the bids of the players are random
variables.
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Theorem 2. The liquid price of anarchy and stability of GSP, VCG (under the no-over assumption) and EGFP are at
most 2.
PROOF. Let M ∈ {GSP,VCG,EGFP} and consider any n-player position game G(M). Let vi and ci be the value
and budget of player i ∈ [n], and let αj be the CTR of position j ∈ [n]. Let b be an equilibrium bid vector that induces
an assignment σ(b); recall that pij(b) denotes the player that is assigned to position j. Moreover, let oi denote the
position given to player i at an optimal allocation, and OPT =
∑
imin{αoivi, ci}.
Now, consider the following partition of the players: A = {i : ασi(b)vi ≤ ci}. Then, for every player i 6∈ A, we
have that min{ασi(b)vi, ci} = ci ≥ min{αoivi, ci}, and by summing over all such players, we obtain∑
i6∈A
min{ασi(b)vi, ci} ≥
∑
i6∈A
min{αoivi, ci}. (1)
The rest of the proof is dedicated to showing that, for any player i ∈ A and some γ > 0, it holds that
ui(b) ≥ min{αoivi, ci} −min{αoivpioi (b), cpioi (b)} − γ. (2)
Then, since min{ασi(b)vi, ci} = ασi(b)vi ≥ ui(b), by summing over all players i ∈ A, and by the fact that |A| ≤ n,
we obtain ∑
i∈A
min{ασi(b)vi, ci} ≥
∑
i∈A
min{αoivi, ci} −
∑
i∈A
min{αoivpioi (b), cpioi (b)} − γ|A|
≥
∑
i∈A
min{αoivi, ci} − LW(σ(b))− γn. (3)
Hence, the theorem will follow by combining inequalities (1) and (3), and by choosing γ to be arbitrarily small, since
we have that
LW(σ(b)) =
∑
i 6∈A
min{ασi(b)vi, ci}+
∑
i∈A
min{ασi(b)vi, ci}
≥
∑
i 6∈A
min{αoivi, ci}+
∑
i∈A
min{αoivi, ci} − LW(σ(b))− γn
≥ OPT− LW(σ(b))− γn.
We now distinguish between cases depending on which mechanism is used. In the following, since the mechanism
under consideration is clear from context, we drop it from our notation.
GSP. For any player i ∈ A consider the deviating bid bpioi (b) + γ˜, where bpioi (b) is the bid of the player that is given
position oi at equilibrium and γ˜ = γαoi
is such that bpioi (b) ≤ bpioi (b) + γ˜ ≤ bpioi−1(b); notice that player i can choose
such a γ˜ as she has full information about the bids of the other players, and there exists a tie-breaking assigning the
position oi to player i after the deviation (in case of equality). With this deviating bid, player i essentially plays only
for her optimal position oi, if she can afford to do so.
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If the deviating bid bpioi (b) + γ˜ satisfies the no-over assumption, then player i is guaranteed to be given position
oi in the new allocation and pay bpioi (b) per click. By the equilibrium condition, the fact that γ > 0, and since
αoibpioi (b) ≤ min{αoivpioi (b), cpioi (b)} (by the no-over assumption for player pioi(b)), we have that
ui(b) ≥ ui(bpioi (b) + δ,b−i) = αoi(vi − bpioi (b)) ≥ min{αoivi, ci} −min{αoivpioi (b), cpioi (b)} − γ.
If the deviating bid does not satisfy the no-over assumption, then we have that bpioi (b) + γ˜ > vi or
αoi(bpioi (b) + γ˜) > ci. Due to the no-over assumption for player pioi(b), both of these inequalities imply that
min{αoivpioi (b), cpioi (b)} + γ > min{αoivi, ci}. Since player i has non-negative utility at equilibrium, we conclude
that
ui(b) ≥ 0 > min{αoivi, ci} −min{αoivpioi (b), cpioi (b)} − γ,
as desired.
VCG. The proof is similar to that for GSP. The main difference here is that when the deviating bid bpioi (b) + γ˜ of
player i ∈ A satisfies the no-over assumption, then player i is again guaranteed to be given position oi, but now has
to pay
∑n
j=oi+1
bpij(b)(αj−1 − αj) in total. Observe that, since VCG is a greedy mechanism, at equilibrium we have
that bpioi (b) ≥ bpij(b) for every j ∈ {oi + 1, ..., n}. This implies that
n∑
j=oi+1
bpij(b)(αj−1 − αj) ≤ bpioi (b)
n∑
j=oi+1
(αj−1 − αj) = bpioi (b)(αoi − αn) ≤ αoibpioi (b).
Using this, we can follow the proof template for GSP and show the desired inequality.
EGFP. For any player i ∈ A consider the deviating bid vector y so that yoi = bpioi (b),oi + γ and yj = 0 for any other
position j 6= oi. Again, player i plays only for her optimal position oi, if she can afford to do so. If yoi > ci, then
since the utility of player i is non-negative at equilibrium, we obtain
ui(b) ≥ 0 > ci − bpioi (b),oi − γ ≥ min{αoivi, ci} −min{αoivpioi (b), cpioi (b)} − γ,
where the last inequality follows by the fact that player pioi(b) has non-negative utility at equilibrium and her payment
is within her budget, which imply that bpioi (b),oi ≤ min{αoivpioi (b), cpioi (b)}.
Otherwise, the deviating bid is such that player i is allocated position oi and her payment yoi is within her budget.
Therefore, by the equilibrium condition, and by the fact that bpioi (b),oi ≤ min{αoivpioi (b), cpioi (b)}, we have that
ui(b) ≥ ui(y,b−i) ≥ αoivi − bpioi (b),oi − γ ≥ min{αoivi, ci} −min{αoivpioi (b), cpioi (b)} − γ
and inequality (2) follows. 
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4. Possible extensions
In this letter, we studied the efficiency of several well-known mechanisms for the allocation of (advertising) posi-
tions to strategic budget-constrained users, and proved that their liquid price of anarchy and stability for pure equilibria
is exactly 2. Of course, there are multiple interesting open questions that one could attempt to answer here, like ex-
ploring all position mechanisms and bounding their liquid price of anarchy and stability. In particular, is there any
position mechanism with liquid price of anarchy strictly smaller than 2, even for the fundamental case of two players?
Another important direction for future research is to consider more general settings, possibly with incomplete
information where both the values and the budgets of the players are randomly drawn from a prior distribution, and
bound the liquid price of anarchy of position mechanisms for more general equilibrium notions, like coarse-correlated
and Bayes-Nash equilibria. Finally, it might be interesting to study scenarios where the budgets of the players are
assumed to be common knowledge (or they can be inferred in some way), and design mechanisms with improved
social efficiency guarantees, by exploiting this information.
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